

# AIRGRAM

762.00/11-96v

**EXCISE**  
 FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
E	P	IO
4	1	2
L	FRD	
1		
BTF	S/P	(SIS)
5	1	(27)
AGR	COM	PRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	KMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
5	16	5
OSD	USIA	NSA
12	8	3
		ML
		2

A-339  
NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : BORN, PARIS, LONDON, MOSCOW, USAREUR

FROM : USBER BERLIN

DATE: Nov 9, 1962

SUBJECT: Recent Expressed Soviet Views on Berlin

REF :

PARIS also for USRO, Stoessel and McGuire; USAREUR for POLAD

Margarete SPITZER, a West Berliner and stringer for the London Observer and London Times, told the Public Affairs Officer that she and other West Berlin and West German correspondents had talked on October 29 and 30 with USSR First Secretary Aleksandr Yakovlevich BOGOMOLOV and other Soviet Embassy people and Soviet correspondents from East Berlin. During those conversations the Soviets expressed the following views on the Berlin question:

1. They professed to believe the USSR has won a victory in Cuba. It is more important in the long run, they pointed out, that the United States commit itself to not invading Cuba and that Soviet presence in Cuba be assured, than that Soviet rocket bases remain on the island.

2. They said what is required now is negotiations in which "reason will win the Western Powers over to the Soviet position." Specifically they argued for a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression agreement, not excluding the possibility of a partial withdrawal of NATO troops from West Germany and Soviet troops from East Germany. Connected with this, they said, should be the withdrawal of British, French and American troops from West Berlin and their replacement by neutral troops under a UN arrangement, with Swedes and Austrians specifically mentioned. According to the Soviets, a strong and carefully written US-USSR agreement then could be worked out stating, among other things, that the US would consider any attack on West Berlin as an attack upon itself.

3. They claimed to foresee a long period of general negotiations ahead and appeared to be uneasy about any haste in the Berlin question.

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

 Drafted by: USIS:Adriensing  
 POL:LTStull/cgw - 11/6/62

 Contents and Classification Approved by:  
 ARDay

Clearances: EAS 9/11/62

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MB

 REVIEWED BY: [Signature]  
 DATE: 3/4/83  
 ( ) RELEASE  
 ( ) ENCLOSE  
 ( ) DENY  
 ( ) CLASSIFY  
 ( ) DECLASSIFY IN PART  
 ( ) NON-RESPONSIVE INFO.  
 ( ) FOI, EO or PA exemptions

 TS authority to: OADR  
 ( ) CLASSIFY AS  
 ( ) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) G-ADR

when one reporter asked whether they thought an agreement on Berlin could be reached in six months, Bogomolov answered, "Do you think that it can be reached by the end of 1963?" The Soviets indicated that a separate peace treaty was the last step to be taken (following successful negotiations) and not something for the immediate future.

4. When asked about Zorin's statement at the UN as reported by the DPA wire service (that the USSR will not allow itself to be trapped into military initiatives in Berlin), the Soviets said that this statement was correct and a valid interpretation of Soviet government policy.

Bogomolov's comments on this occasion contrasted sharply with his reticence a few days earlier on October 26 when he told Hans Jakub STEHLE, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Berlin correspondent, that Cuba was a far too sensitive topic for him to offer even a personal opinion.

Comment: The Soviet line is notable for the relaxed attitude on timing of a German peace treaty and the related stress on protracted negotiations. Otherwise, it appears to combine face-saving concerning Cuba with a hodgepodge of previous Soviet proposals for a Berlin settlement.

For the Assistant Chief of Mission:



Arthur R. Day  
Chief, Political Affairs Section

**EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS**

**TO**

TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : BONN, PARIS, LONDON, MOSCOW, USAREUR

FROM : USBER BERLIN

DATE: Nov 9, 1962

**SUBJECT: Recent Expressed Soviet Views on Berlin**

**REF :**

PARIS also for USRO, Stoessel and McGuire; USAREUR for POLAD

Margarete SPITZER, a West Berliner and stringer for the London Observer and London Times, told the Public Affairs Officer that she and other West Berlin and West German correspondents had talked on October 29 and 30 with

Soviet Embassy people and Soviet correspondents from East Berlin. During those conversations the Soviets expressed the following views on the Berlin question:

1. They professed to believe the USSR has won a victory in Cuba. It is more important in the long run, they pointed out, that the United States commit itself to not invading Cuba and that Soviet presence in Cuba be assured, than that Soviet rocket bases remain on the island.
2. They said what is required now is negotiations in which "reason will win the Western Powers over to the Soviet position." Specifically they argued for a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression agreement, not excluding the possibility of a partial withdrawal of NATO troops from West Germany and Soviet troops from East Germany. Connected with this, they said, should be the withdrawal of British, French and American troops from West Berlin and their replacement by neutral troops under a UN arrangement, with Swedes and Austrians specifically mentioned. According to the Soviets, a strong and carefully written US-USSR agreement then could be worked out stating, among other things, that the US would consider any attack on West Berlin as an attack upon itself.
3. They claimed to foresee a long period of general negotiations ahead and appeared to be uneasy about any haste in the Berlin question.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**FOR DEPT. USE ONLY**

☒ In ☐ Out

FORM 4-62 **DS-323**

Drilled by: USIS:Kuenemist  
POL:LTStull/cw 11/6/62  
Content and Classification Approved by: ARDay

**CLEARANCES**

EAS 6/11/45


When one reporter asked whether they thought an agreement on Berlin could be reached in six months, ... answered: "Do you think that it can be reached by the end of 1963?" The Soviets indicated that a separate peace treaty was the last step to be taken (following successful negotiations) and not something for the immediate future.

4. When asked about Zorin's statement at the UN as reported by the DPA wire service (that the USSR will not allow itself to be trapped into military initiatives in Berlin), the Soviets said that this statement was correct and a valid interpretation of Soviet government policy.

... comments on this occasion contrasted sharply with his reticence a few days earlier on October 26 when he told Hans Jakob STEHLE, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Berlin correspondent, that Cuba was a far too sensitive topic for him to offer even a personal opinion.

Comment: The Soviet line is notable for the relaxed attitude on timing of a German peace treaty and the related stress on protracted negotiations. Otherwise, it appears to combine face-saving concerning Cuba with a hodgepodge of previous Soviet proposals for a Berlin settlement.

For the Assistant Chief of Mission:



Arthur R. Day  
Chief, Political Affairs Section

CONFIDENTIAL